Labour market segmentation in South Africa by Cassim, Fuad
U N I V E R S I T Y OF THE WITWATERSRAND
A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW
4.00pm MARCH 1982
Title: Labour Market" Segmentation in South Africa.
by: Fuad ("ass i.m
No. 114
U N I V E R S I T Y OF THE WITWATERSRAND
A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented at Seminar in
RW 319 at 4.00 pm on Monday,
29 March, 1982.
LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.
INTRODUCTION
This paper questions the applicability of neoclassical
theory to the South African labour market and it adopts an
alternative approach, namely, segmented labour market theory.
Segmented labour market (SLM) theory has emerged only
recently as an alternative to neoclassical analysis of wage
determination. Drawing on this approach it will be shown
that a model of racial dualism provides a better explanatory
framework and generates greater insight into the issues of
poverty and discrimination confronting the South African
labour market. Moreover, viewing the labour market within
this analytical perspective sheds some light on the inade-
quacies and failure of recent state policy.
The paper begins with an analysis of the structure of
labour markets in particular, and the concepts of the
internal labour market (ILM), the dual labour market (DLM),
and labour market segmentation in general. This is followed
by an analysis of labour markets in South Africa. Though lack
of adequate data poses a problem in so far as testing of the
theory is concerned, the broad tendencies within the South
African labour market indicate that the DLM approach can
provide a useful basis to analyse the problems of low pay
and income distribution. Finally, useful policy implica-
tions flow from this analysis.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The classical theory of wage determination was more
concerned with the determination of the aggregate level of
wages whilst neoclassical theorists place their emphasis on
the personal distribution of income. According to neo-
classical theory the market for labour is determined like
any other commodity, that is, by the intersection of demand
and supply curves. On the demand side we have marginal
productivity theory where firms view labour in terms of its
productive quality; on the supply side following Schultz,
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Becker, and others we have human capital theory- Human
capital theorists argue that wages are determined in accor-
dance with the level of skill. Skill differences result
from the different amounts of human capital invested- Thus
supply and demand jointly determine wage levels and
employment.
At a more general level the individual is seen as the
primary category for analysis. This means that the distri-
bution of income is not seen as a structural phenomenon but
individuals are assumed to behave rationally and therefore
it is left to the individual to improve his/her welfare.
Within this analytical framework the next step is to argue
that individuals can raise their productivity through
prolonged education and learning on the job. How then do
neoclassicists analyse the two paramount problems of poverty
and discrimination?
Within the choice theoretic framework of neoclassical
theory, poverty would be viewed as a "result of some
individual failure which can be corrected by individual
adaptation". x The poor remain poor because they lack
marketable skills or have failed to invest in themselves -
poverty is the result of market forces and"individual utility
preferences. The shortcoming of this interpretation of
poverty is that policy based on it in terms of education and
manpower programmes have not significantly alleviated the
problem of poverty.
The basic prediction of the human capital model2 which
purports that there exists a positive correlation between
education, training and earnings certainly explains some
of the variation in wage differences but excludes a number
of variables outside the individuals control. To simply
correlate education with earnings is highly misleading since
there exists substantial wage variation-within occupations,
and a cross-section analysis of the whole occupational
structure does not really capture the dynamics of any
individual segment of the spectrum. As suggested by
B. Bluestone3, "for many of the working poor, the problem
may lie in the industries in which they work, not in the
skills they individually possess." This means one must turn
to the industrial and labour market structure to determine
wage differences for the same occupation and level of human
capital that individuals possess.
The fact that a large number of variables, such as race,
class, sex and age, are outside the individuals control
results in different amounts of human capital being embodied
within different groups of people in society. In a critical
assessment of human capital theory Bowles and Gintis1* make
the point that "the process of individual choice aggrega-
tion, even if it is relevant to educational change, works
within economic constraints determined almost entirely
outside both the consumers and citizens arena of choice".
Thus economic inequality does not simply stem from individual
differences in skills and ability, but is a structural
aspect of existing society. Education on its own is a
doubtful policy instrument as a remedy for inequality since
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it fails to take into account how the educational structure
also reproduces the status quo by securing existing posi-
tions of privilege.
From a critical neoclassical perspective the job com-
petition model put forward by Thurow appears to offer a
more realistic perspective than conventional wage competition
theory. The job competition model argues that most skills
are acquired on-the-job rather than exogenously. Employers
rank all workers along a labour queue and make use of
observable characteristics such as race and sex to draw on
workers for training. This results in the fact that "the
rationing function of the labour market makes repression of
direct wage competition profitable". Implicit in this
view is the concept of the internal labour market which will
i- r - — t~~<z * It:*'"''•
Even though on-the-job training may enhance earnings since
workers inherit certain skills, Bowles and Gintis6 cast
their doubt on this relationship. They maintain that if
this were so then workers with the same length of experience
in a certain job would not be affected by age "but to the
contrary they found age to have a significant impact". What
the authors do emphasize is the role of social relations of
work which determines the earnings of black males and female
workers.
To be more concrete, in South Africa where the black
population is significantly less educated, education can be
shown to be an important factor in their low average pay.
But the reason for low pay is not only a supply-side pheno-
menon, different groups can have unequal levels of schooling
for both supply and demand reasons. Human capital theorists
emphasize the supply side. On the demand side Blacks face
a lower rate of return7 to given amounts of education and
therefore decide to invest less in human capital. On the
supply side, however, inequality is enhanced because of
discrimination in the provision of government expenditure
on education.
A basic supply and demand diagram can illustrate the
problem.
Rate of Return
Amount invested
in human capital
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Since 3lacks recoup a lower rate of return we have curve
Dw and Db representing demand curves for Whites and Blacks
respectively. If supply of funds into education is the same,
it can be represented by curve Sw, in this case the equili-
brium rate of return to education for blacks.is lower than
of whites, shown by points A and B. However, if the supply
of funds is not the same, then the curve for blacks shifts
to the left Sb, where the difference in amounts of educa-
tion grows much further. But the difference in equilibrium
rates of return becomes small as can be seen by comparing
points A and C. Therefore contrary to what is often thought,
a higher case of return for education for blacks and whites
would be more evidential of discrimination.
If we turn to the discrimination, which is a pervasive
problem in South Africa and where state legislation has
played an active role, it will be seen that discrimination
cannot be divorced from the problem of poverty but in fact
exacerbates it and the two coincide with one another. In
1922 Edgeworth8 put foward the "crowding hypothesis" as an
explanation of discrimination. However this approach does
not explain why certain groups are excluded from jobs for
which they are capable. As Chiplin and Sloane suggest,
crowding could be seen as a symptom rather than a cause of
the problem and crowding as such must include "elements of
occupational and monopoly power discrimination if it is to
be a meaningful model'1.9 Analytically, since certain groups
are over-represented in certain jobs - pure wage discrimina-
tion results but perhaps more important is the reason why
certain groups are employed in low-paying jobs. A simple
way to test the effects of crowding on the wage structure
is to see whether this results from productivity differences.
And evidence does not support the notion that black workers
are less productive then their white counterparts.
Remaining very much within the neoclassical tradition
Becker's10 analysis revived interest in the subject of
discrimination. Becker uses the concept of a 'taste for
discrimination1 to explain wage differences between Blacks
and Whites. This like any other taste determines market
behaviour in conjunction with relative prices given utility
maximisation. However, Arrow11 maintains that there is a
lack of specifity in the hypothesis being advanced since
it does not explain why discrimination takes place.
Furthermore standardising for a number of demand and supply
side factors, a large part of the wage differential remains
unexplained. Arrow suggests that in a competitive market,
wage discrimination would disappear, since non-discrimina-
tors would use a cheaper labour force, namely. Blacks, and
hence become more profitable. So in the long run the
assumption of profit maximization leads us to expect that
race discrimination will be eliminated in a competitive
market.
Though there have been a number of modifications and
extensions to Becker's analysis, they still suffer from a
basic weakness in explaining why discrimination occurs.
In the words of S.J. Lord, "neoclassical models view
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discrimination as the outcome of market-place interactions
of individuals, some of whom have discriminatory prefer-
ences. We are given no explanation of why these individuals
happen to have such preferences; neoclassical theory
conventionally treats preferences as exogenoucly determined.
This results in a circularity in the argument: discrimina-
tion is the result of individual preferences, and the only
way we know that individuals have these preferences is
because we know discrimination takes place in the labour
market."12 The major weakness with such analyses is that
they tend to analyse tendencies towards equilibrium and how
individuals maximise income. In other words, they do not
look at variables that are not total.ly within the control of
the individual. Hence until an attempt is made to incor-
porate both economic and extra-economic {which are usually
reaarded as exogenous) variable? neoclassical explanations
will be subject to limited explanatory power.
Becker's mode of analysis if applied to South Africa
reduces discrimination to the trivial problem of choice.
Becker's approach completely ignores the exertion of power
by the state; employers and trade unions: it disregards
the non-competitive contexts. The concept of a 'taste for
discrimination' does not allow the disenfranchised to
exercise their choice since they are not able to discri-
minate. Thus, a process of historical evolution in South
Africa has formalized discrimination within the structure
of society in such a way that it effectively removes choice
from its black population.
Having pointed to some of the weaknesses and limitations
which plague neoclassical analysis let us now turn to an
alternative formulation of labour markets.
LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION
The neoclassical framework failed to explain the persistent
problems of poverty, inequality, race and sex discrimin-
ation and this led to the emergence of dual labour market
theory. This theory espouses that the labour market is
broken into two or more distinct sectors. It maintains that
education on its own is a doubtful policy instrument for
improving the distribution of income, and that emphasis
should be shifted from the supply to the demand side.13 The
concept of labour market segmentation is a general one, and
there exist various proponents who differ on the causes of
segmentation. One of these, the radical interpretation of
segmentation, focuses on monopoly capital as the basic cause
in attempting to control factor and product markets through
a policy of 'divide and rule.11* This paper, however, will
only concentrate on the institutional analysis of segmen-
tation - the approach most strongly identified with
P. Doeringes and M. Piore.15
Dual labour market (DLM) theory states that the labour
market consists of two distinct sectors, a primary sector
and a secondary sector - the notion of a homogenous labour
market is rejected. The primary sector is associated with
high wages, good working conditions, better chances of
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advancement, employment stability, and strong unionisation.
By contrast, the secondary sector offers jobs that are low-
paying, with poor working conditions, employment, insta-
bility and lack of unionisation. Thus, the basic ideas
behind dualism can be described as follows:
(a) There are two separate labour markets, a
primary and secondary sector.
(b) Workers compete within each market, for
jobs, wages and employment in
general.
(c) Workers in the secondary sector are treated
in a more inferior way than those in the
primary sector.
(d) Mobility barriers prohibit the movement of
workers from the secondary to the primary
sector.
The above hypothesis was primarily developed to explain the
problem of disadvantaged workers, that is Blacks and women,
and it implies that they are confined to the secondary
sectors. Thus, to analyse the persistence of low pay in
relation to the economic structure, DLM theory points to
the development of internal or 'balkanized' labour markets
(to use Kerr's term) under modern capitalism.
An institutional model developed by Kerr suggests that
the labour market does not operate in an open manner where-
by all jobs are simply available to those who bid for them.
In fact, institutional rules severely impede mobility.
More specifically, Kerr adopts a two-way classification,
that is the structureless and structured types of labour
markets. Open markets are basically unstructured and subject
to competitive forces, and are characterized by an absence
of firm-specific training. The structured labour market
consists of an internal and external market. "The internal
market may be the plant or craft group, and preferment within
it may be based on prejudice or equality of opportunity or
seniority or some combination of these. The external
market consists of clusters of workers actively or passively
lying within some meaningful geographical and occupational
boundaries, and of the part or parts of entry which are
open or are potentially open to them."16 The result of this
is inevitably a fragmentation of the labour market which
impedes labour mobility. Hence, with this new organiza-
tional form called the 'internal labour market1 (ILM), there
will be little influence of competitive forces on the
internal wage structure, which is determined by custom and
rules. It is in this direction that DLM theory has made
a significant advance over neoclassical theory because it
examines the effects of the ILM, and also those excluded
from it in the external sector. ILM theory may be seen as
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an attempt to explain how labour market imperfections
modify the competitive labour market.
Doeringer and Piore have developed this theoretical
framework much further and also in more precise terms. They
define the ILM as an "administrative unit, within which the
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of
administrative rules and procedures".17 The ILM is distin-
guished from the external labour market (ELM) where wages
are more directly determined by market forces. The two
markets are nevertheless linked at various job classifica-
tions which constitute ports of entry and exit to and from
the ILM, while other jobs within the ILM are reached by
transfer and promotion. This is an important distinction
since the existing employees are given preferential treat-
ment over outsiders or the disadvantaged workers. The
main factors giving rise to internal labour markets are
attributed to skill-specifity, customary law and on-the-job
training.
Firms that have internal labour markets are not dependent
on the external labour market to fill most jobs. There
exist job loaders or mobility clusters which determine the
promotion of workers. Promotion is determined more by
seniority than ability or productivity, which means that
new workers are hired mainly at pcrts of entry at the
bottom end of the job queue. Since wages are related to
seniority the consequence of this is a reduction of labour
turnover and hence ILMs become beneficial to employees.
The concept of the ILM does have a link with human
capital theory. Though economists like Becker19 and Oi 1 9;
discuss skill-specific and on-the-job training, Doeringer
and Piore have developed the implications of fixity within
their model. ILMs tend to develop because most skills
appear to be learned on the job itself and are becoming more
firm-specific. So work skills are then not the main
barrier to primary jobs. Furthermore in order to develop
a stable labour force, skill-specifity and on-the-job
training encourage the employer to develop an internal
labour market with a low degree of labour turnover. This
is done by paying higher wages. Hence, the most important
aspect of ILM is the provision for incentives for job
stability and a reduction in labour turnover. Finally,
the role of custom is essentially to make wage differentials
unresponsive to market conditions, but custom itself does
not determine what these differentials will be. Thus, wages
and mobility are determined by administrative rules and not
competitively.
It has been suggested that large and well-organized
firms are more likely to have an internal labour market.
Edwards20 suggests, the need for such a structure for
internal control to maintain a stable productive output
and stability of the employment relationship. As firms
grow in size bureaucratic control tends to increase,
because of the need to co-ordinate and control the labour
force.
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Since dualists contend that mobility barriers are
important, we must ask how they manifest themselves. Piore21
suggests that a fundamental criterion which differentiates
jobs between the primary and secondary sector is the
behavioural requirements which each sector imposes, and in
particular, employment stability. Many workers are not
likely to enter the primary labour market, especially those
with poor work histories and habits, low education, and
also women and Blacks. This kind of statistical
discrimination rejects a large proportion of the workforce
and is probably a cheap way of screening out those with
little skills and undesired work patterns. Statistical
discrimination is most likely to occur where certain
workers are trapped simply because their superficial
characteristics i.e. race, resemble those of secondary
workers.
If a large proportion of the poor had no capacity to
work or no skills at all then the problem of poverty and
discrimination would be an entirely different one. But this
is most definitely not the case, in fact, low income or
poverty is due to many other factors. Many workers who
initially began to work in the secondary sector may never
reach the primary sector. Therefore, unlike those in the
primary sector, secondary sector workers are continually
moving between low-status jobs in search of higher wages
and better working conditions. Blacks are dispropor-
tionately relegated to the secondary sector at the very
beginning despite their abilities and skills and hence
cannot escape from being trapped within the secondary
sector. Many become pessimistic and discouraged which
leads them to a situation of chronic unemployment. Thus
an important implication of DLM theory is that most of the
poor can be described as the "working poor11. As stated by
Sen, "Employment is an important means of generating and
distributing income, but a person can be rich yet unem-
ployed, if he has other sources of income and also a person
can work very hard and still be very poor. Poverty is a
function of technology and productivity, of ownership of
the means of production, and of exploitation and social
arrangements for production and distribution."22
To sum up. The primary labour market consists of a
series of internal labour markets with ports of entry,
whilst the secondary sector is basically unstructured and
open. The purpose of distinguishing between the two is
based upon the fact that certain groups of workers become
trapped within the secondary sector. Furthermore, the
process of wage determination is different between the two
sectors. In the primary sector wages are not responsive
to the forces of supply and demand. Discrimination basi-
cally increases the labour force in the secondary sector,
thus depressing the wage and giving employers an interest
in its continuance. Thus, what distinguishes the DLM from
all other approaches is the assumption that segmentation of
the labour market eliminates mobility for workers in the
secondary sector.
Labour Market Segmentation in South Africa
In general labour market segmentation theories focus on
barriers to mobility, as opposed to human capital theorists
who simply focus on the acquisition of human capital. As
suggested by Wachrel and Betsy labour supply functions
may differ amongst similar groups because of differences in
education and training, work patterns, and residential
location, whereas labour demand functions differ because of
discrimination by race and sex, industrial structure and
trade union barriers to entry. This means that public
policy should not merely concentrate on the acquisition of
human capital but "how this human capital is used in the
labour market." They conclude by saying that "as long as
public policy focuses exclusively on the characteristics
of individuals, and not as well on the structure of the
economic environment in which the individual works, we can
continue to anticipate the same disappointing results that
public policy has produced in the last decade."23 Thus,
an important contribution of DLM theory is that it
distinguishes between the primary and secondary sectors
and the lack of mobility between them. This suggests that
the nature of such markets is more adequately explained by
institutional and structural forces than narrow economic
variables as in the neoclassical approach.
RACIAL DUALISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET
To establish the case for the DLM in South Africa at an
empirical level for the entire labour market involves an
exercise beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
drawing upon various sources the dualist tendency within
the labour market is fairly evident. The point here is to
understand the reasons for the persistence of poverty and
discrimination and the contribution that DLM theory makes
in offering a potentially better explanatory framework.
As noted by Gordon (with reference to orthodox theory),
"that which cannot be precisely modelled is often relegated
to a secondary or qualifying tier of the analysis. These
methodological inclinations lead to static analyses. They
also place a heavy burden on the analysts ability to hold
enough about the world 'constant' to permit model formu-
lation. Even if the analyst admits that the world is
changing, he must act for the moment, as if it is not."zt|
Let us briefly consider the tests that could be undertaken
to establish segmentation within the labour market.
Firstly, the bi-modality test in the distribution of
jobs. Bi-modality is associated with occupational segre-
gation where some members of the labour force are concen-
trated in certain occupational groups. Secondly, we have
a socio-economic mobility test, which establishes the
impediments in movement between secondary and primary
employment. The final test is the truncated earnings
function, showing that investment in education might be
more profitable for those who belong to the primary sector
than for those who belong to the secondary sector.25
Labour Market Segmentation in South Africa 10
Some studies attempt to identify the existence of dualism
by means of a single measure. For instance, Bosanquet and
Doeringer use differential rates of increase with age-
earnings profiles of particular groups of workers.27 But
this may not be an adequate test since age-earnings pro-
files can be subject to different interpretations.28
Gordon suggests that factor analysis of multiple occupa-
tional and industrial characteristics resolves the problem
of using a single measure. However, the most thorough test
of labour market segmentation theory is that of Wachtel and
Betsy who use two-stage regression analysis. They run
regressions with wages specified as a function of personal
characteristics, then calculating an adjusted wage variable
with the characteristics variable removed. Thereafter the
process is reversed to test for the effects of personal
characteristics upon wages after elimination of the effects
of structural variables. The result being that all the
independent variables proved to be significant.
A serious confusion should be avoided when discussing
race and the DLM. In attempting to establish whether a
DLM exists one should avoid using characteristics of the
worker to define the DLM, instead the definition should be
in terms of the job characteristics. Barron and Norris29
suggest that this could lead to an 'inferential problem',
that is to say the characteristics of a job tend to be
closely correlated with characteristics of individuals and
therefore results in "explanations that become entirely
circular".
In attempting to apply the DLM approach to the South
African labour market, a caveat should be made. At a
theoretical level dualism on its own need not have racial
implications since employment discrimination within internal
labour markets inevitably arises because workers who enter
at certain ports of entry have privileges, job security and
promotional opportunities conferred upon them. However,
observing the development of the labour market in South
Africa racial discrimination has occurred through systema-
tic legislation and rules and therefore race becomes a
strategic factor in the analysis. However, some researchers
may argue that in view of the current labour dispensation,
discriminatory legislation is being abandoned and this in
effect consequentially changes the terms of the debate.
Having noted this development, it will be suggested here
that we can still not evade the racial factor. Though
formal legislation officially eliminates race under some
circumstances, it is important to bear in mind that
informal rules, customs, etc. will still perpetuate racial
employment patterns.3 °
An article by Knight31 in 1964 couched in terms of a
dual economy made the case for labour market segmentation.
However accelerated growth after the 1960s and the
relaxation of the colour bar which resulted in some job
advancement leads Knight and McGrath to suggest that the
"assumption of complete segmentation in the 1964 model is
less adequate and calls for an analysis of wage
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discrimination."32 The authors suggest that the 'crowding
hypothesis' is the most useful for explaining wage
discrimination in South Africa, since the internal labour
market concept though relevant is not supported by evidence
in particular labour turnover.33
To replace the concepts of the ILM and DLM with the
'crowding hypothesis" by citing labour turnover needs to be
questioned. Crowding however does exist and is certainly
not irrelevant but its explanatory power is limited as
discussed above. The DLM approach offers far greater
insight, especially with regard to institutions and
divisions within the labour market which do not emerge
from the 'crowding hypothesis', since wage and employment
discrimination is the result of the institutional and
structural development of the labour market. As suggested
by Gordon "the DLM theory does place great emphasis on job
stability as a source of index between the two markets.
This difference between the two markets is only approximate,
Not all workers in the primary labour market work steadily
at a single job all their lives. Simple measure of job
stability will not suffice to capture the distinctions
between markets ... . The separation arises from potential
rewards for job stability - both objectively and as
mediated by subjective evaluation. However intractable,
some decent measures of the more precise formulation of
the difference between the two sectors will be necessary in
order to make very precise tests of the theory".3*1 Hence,
perhaps a more fruitful criticism of DLM theory is that of
its parochial two-sector approach and that it over-empha-
sizes the advantages of employment in the primary sector.
On the question of labour turnover, Barron and Norris
suggest that we should not confuse 'higher involuntary
turnover rates' (a characteristic of the job) and 'higher
voluntary rates'. They say that "a failure to unravel the
different strands of 'individual' and 'structural'causation
can lead to a crude identification of individual character-
istics and an unwarranted emphasis upon those characteri-
stics as causes"35 Thus, labour turnover needs to be
tested in relation to job conditions, the satisfaction or
dissatisfaction of workers, wages and attractiveness of
work. Primarily, labour turnover should be seen as a
function of factors in the work situation.
In formulating a model of racial dualism for the South
African labour market, we can postulate a "White" sector
and a 'Black' sector which are the results of a historical
process of segmentation of the labour market, in which the
distribution of individual jobs and income have become
dominated by the superficial characteristic of race. The
labour market manifests a glaring disparity between white
and black workers - income, occupation and training
indicate that black workers are still confined to certain
sectors of the labour market. We can now turn to some
important generalisations.36
Firstly, in South Africa we have two distinct labour
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markets, one for white labour and one for black labour.
Each market is governed by different laws, institutions
and mechanisms for the recruitment, training and allocation
of jobs and workers.
Secondly, the black labour force has acted as a pool of
surplus labour - a large part of which is locked into jobs
traditionally looked upon as black jobs. These jobs usually
entail low wages, little skill and education, and frequently
suffer from seasonal or cyclical unemployment.
Thirdly, segregation at large is sustained by a number of
connected and reinforcing supportive institutions whose
total impact is much greater than each institution on its
own. The racial demarcation and differentiation created in
any one institutional area work is impediments and support
other institutions. This racial division of labour is
enhanced by barriers in other areas of society such as
housing, education and transport, which react and affect
an individual's labour market position.
The above phenomenon has resulted in entrenched struc-
tural relationships which still persist today. Hence, the
differences in income, employment, occupation, training and
labour-force participation rates indicate the existence of
a dual labour market- This means we have two separate and
persistent patterns of employment characteristics which
cannot be explained in terms of a unitary labour market.
But this only explains dualism at a general level which
is evident to most researchers. In more specific terms,
a racially dual labour market means .that white workers are
predominantly recruited in the primary labour market while
black workers are predominantly relegated to the secondary
labour market. And each sector faces different supply and
demand forces determining employment.
The racial dualism of labour can be seen operating
through many levels, such as those of occupation, industry,
geographic area, firms and departments within firms. As
noted by Knight and McGrath once Blacks with equal effi-
ciency take over so-called white jobs this results in a
downward pressure on the wage rate. Blacks are usually
placed in certain job classifications and generally, the
lower the pay or the more harsher or dirtier the job, the
higher the concentration of Blacks.37
The racial concentration by sector is significant as
seen in table 1.
Thus, the data in table 1 shows a marked dualist ten-
dency within the South African labour force. Furthermore,
the fact that African workers are concentrated in certain
sectors and regions affects their earnings in a significant
way.38 As far as the determination of earnings in the agri-
cultural and domestic service sectors are concerned, these
are at the bottom rung of a labour market made up of low
productivity and low earnings with a concentration of
black workers. At the other extreme whites are concen-
trated in manufacturing, commerce and finance and the
professional service sectors, by far the higher paying
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sectors with fringe benefits and promotional opportunities.
TABLE 1 Racial Allocation of Employment by Sector
Percentage of Racial Group Employed in
Sector.
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, Gas
and water
Transport and
Communication
Commerce and
Finance
Other Services
Agriculture
Unemployed and
not specified
Labour Force
8
13
6
1
4
11
20
30
7
African
11
9
5
-
2
6
19
40
7
Asian
0,4
0,35
5
0,1
4
29
12
4
9
Coloured
1
23
11
0,3
4
12
22
16
10
White
4
19
6
1
11
27
22
6
3
Source: South African Statistics 1980
While the broad sectoral classification of employment
evidently shows a dualist tendency, the pattern is even
more distinct when one looks at the occupational distribution
between different races. This is seen below by table 2.
Table 2 indicates that higher rungs of the labour market
are dominated by whites, whereas Africans form the bulk of
the lower end of the job queue. And as far as African
professional ana technical workers are concerned it should
be noted that a large proportion are composed of teachers and
nurses.
More recently, the appearance of two government reports
have resulted in a move to remove discriminatory legislation,
concerning the labour market. This poses the question as to
what the likely impact of such intervention by the state will
be on the labour market. It has been suggested that this
attempt is simply to restructure the racial division of
labour to meet the needs of capital, and the most positive
outcome would result in some form of change in the racial
division of labour at the skilled manual working class and
lower grades of supervisory levels. In the words of Davies,
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this "will lead to a situation in which the 'vanguard'
of the black population 'overtakes1 the rearguard of the
white population".39 The upward mobility of a few black
workers does not necessarily mean that we have an integrated
labour force.
TABLE 2 The Occupational Distribution of Different Racial
Groups
Occupational
category
Professional and
technical
Managerial and
Executive
Clerical
Sales
Protection workers
Unskilled
Source: Departmen
Percentage of
African
23
2
14
24
69
85
t of
,7
,4
,8
,1
Labour
Asian
3,5
2
7,5
8,8
4
1,2.
Manpower
Race Group
Coloured
10,0
1
8,3
10,6
12,1
.12,5.
Survey 1979.
White
63,5
95
69,4
56
14,0
0,5
Data
in the above table excludes agricultural and
domestic workers.
Viewing the labour market as a whole we see that its
segregated and dual structure leads to different responses
from different racial groups. That is to say they develop
separate patterns of job search. For instance certain jobs
are identified with certain racial groups and they do not
tend to overlap with each other. This results in
different racial groups being faced with differing expec-
tations, and that white workers are more likely to be in
occupations that offer more on-the-job training and further
advancement within the job ladder.
The segregated job-search behaviour is reinforced by
the labour bureau system because this limits the free
movement of labour and influences the conditions under
which supply is made available. Moreover, many firms fill
vacancies in a highly personalized manner which results in
recruiting from particular racial groups. Thus most jobs
in the white labour market, or primary sector are not
sought after by blacks. The dualist tendency leading to
different occupations and career patterns is strengthened
significantly by a segregated educational structure. Not
only is there a gap in access to education but compounding
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this is the educational quality gap. Though it is diffi-
cult to measure educational quality directly one cannot
escape from the fact that Blacks attend inferior schools,
and public expenditure on education is divided along
racial lines. Hence, different educational profiles
ensure that high rungs of the job ladder exclude a large
proportion of the black population, leading to a lower
labour force commitment.
Our second generalization was that black workers form
a pool of surplus labour. This point could be more easily
understood within the framework of a dual economy, co-
existing with a modern urban capitalist sector and a
pre-capitalist sector. The capitalist sector draws its
labour from the subsistence sector where there exists
surplus labour. The migratory pattern of labour in South
Africa results in black workers occupying positions at
the bottom of the job queue, which are low paying, dirty,
unsafe and usually of short duration, with little advance-
ment potential. This form of secondary sector employment
directly inhibits occupational mobility since the return
home of migrants at the end of the employment contract
restricts them to unskilled employment or unemployment or
underemployment. Those migrant workers who are absorbed
into the urban informal sector also face very little
mobility between sectors. The informal sector, suggests
Zarenda, "is in many instances a low income, low produc-
tivity sector which when it does generate employment
opportunities tends to cater mainly for secondary workers
such as migrant, young children, women, the aged or infirm,
etc."40
It is interesting to note that the Riekert Report on
its analysis of the South African labour market maintains
that Blacks qualifying under Section 101(a) and (b) are
"mostly members of the primary and internal labour markets
whereas workers having Section 101(d) qualifications are
usually members of the secondary and external labour
markets."1*1 This distinction is highly arbitrary as the
sectoral and occupational distribution of the labour force
shows that the majority of Blacks are dominantly within
the secondary sector. At the same time although sugges-
ting that the institutional labour market is the dominant
form in South Africa, the thrust of the Riekert Report's
recommendations do not amount to an institutional restruc-
turing but rather using government power to reshape the
black labour to fit the existing institutions. Analysing
the impact of these new regulations embedded within the
Riekert Report, D. Hindson suggests that "their immediate
objective is to increase the occupational mobility of
qualified workers and at the same time increase control
over the movement and entry into employment of disqualified
workers. This has a direct economic significance for
Black workers. It helps provide qualified workers with
better access to jobs and thus higher incomes and it tends
to worsen the chances of disqualified workers. There is
also a direct impact as regards unemployment. It is
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reduced amongst qualified workers and increased amongst
disqualified workers."1*2 Thus the reforms currently
advocated may indeed benefit part of the labour force,
in particular those who are endowed with some education
but not those who remain unemployed or 'working poor1.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The major objective of this paper has been to suggest
that a dogmatic reliance upon the neoclassical framework
cannot explain why some workers remain poor and this
framework also cannot account for the persistence of race
disparities. This led to an alternative formulation,
namely, DLM theory but there must be further empirical
testing in this area. The main issue concerns barriers
to mobility from the secondary sector to the primary sector
of the labour market. It is suggested that the incorpora-
tion of institutional and extra-economic variables into
the structure of the labour market within the DLM approach
gives us greater insight into the problems of poverty and
discrimination.
Discrimination in the DLM structure has resulted in
enlarging the secondary sector which in turn lowers wages,
and benefits employees. At the same time this has bene-
fitted workers in the primary sector where ports of entry
limit supply. Race is the most obvious means of differ-
entiating workers. Hence racial dualism within the South
African labour market is a structural phenomenon which
has filtered Blacks into low-paying occupations, to inade-
quate and segregated housing and education. This has
res.ult-ed in predominantly black occupations being charac-
terised by low skillf -little training, and lower promotional
opportunities, than is the situation with jobs designated
as white jobs.
Any analysis of the South African labour market, in
particular the low pay of black workers must be seen within
the structural context and not simply by looking at incomes,
occupational and educational differences. The weakness of
the neoclassical approach is seen in its attempt to isolate
specific problems and develop piecemeal policy measures.
As suggested by M. Reich, the various forces that affect
the black worker are not, "simply additive, but mutually
reinforcing, often a decrease in one narrow form of
discrimination is accompanied by an increase in another.
Since all aspects of racism interact, an analysis of
racism should incorporate all of its aspects in a unified
manner."h 3
If public policy attempts to redress the existing
imbalance between white and black workers it will need to
take a holistic view of the labour market. Public policy
should concern itself with removing barriers to mobility
and dualism as opposed to a unitary or homogenous labour
market. On the supply side, training, education, geogra-
phical location, and work patterns should be thoroughly
investigated, whereas on the demand side, the removal of
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statutory discrimination will not be adequate if
conditions on the supply side remain constant. On the
demand side policy must look at occupational and sectoral
distribution and trade union restrictions.
Because black workers are predominantly concentrated
within the secondary sector and become trapped within it,
DLM theorists place their emphasis on the demand side,
requiring government intervention and expenditure with a
bias towards those in the secondary sector. Given that a
multiplicity of factors interact in creating dualism within
the labour market, the market mechanism cannot be relied
upon as the sole corrective device as suggested by the
Wiehahn and Riekert Reports. However careful consideration
has to be given to the role of the state and non-market
institutions. Firms, which are private decision-makers,
cannot significantly create the re-structuring that is
needed to actively thwart the dualist structure. As
suggested by Baron and Hymer, "the labour market, if
allowed to operate on its own internal forces, does not
generate sufficient economic or social pressure to elimi-
nate racial disparities.""**
Finally, to conclude, the DLM approach can be made
forceful by detailed empirical micro-studies, although
data availability may act as a constraint. Hence the
approach also needs to be strengthened by a more rigorous
historical view of segmentation of the labour market.
Certainly, researchers looking at the South African labour
market can enhance the utility of analysis via the DLM
framework since it remains wide open for rigorous specifi-
cation and testing.
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I am indebted to Mr H. Zarenda for advice on specific
issues and for general remarks. Opinions expressed here
and any errors are the responsibility of the author.
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